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19861 Civil Practice 
a m a t i v e  defenses. 
Recent decisional law by the Court of Appeals has placed new 
limits on the applicability of article 14-A to some assumption of 
risk cases,216 to matters involving some labor law violations,a1° and 
to violations of legal prohibitions.l17 These limitations are impor- 
tant to the practitioner representing clients who seek to benefit 
from New York's comparative negligence statute. 
Article 14-A was enacted upon the recommendation of the Ju- 
dicial Conference218 by chapter 69 of the Laws of 1975 and became 
effective on September 1, 1975.219 This article adopts the doctrine 
of pure comparative negligence;220 its purpose is to permit a partial 
** This section was contributed by Jay C. Carlisle, Assistant Professor of Law, Pace 
University School of Law; A.B., UCLA, 1965; J.D., University of Califomin, 1969. Professor 
Carlisle is the revision author for W E I N S T E I N - K O R N - ~ ~  NEW YORK CIVIL Prucnce (arti- 
cles 13,14A, 15.30 and 78). 
215. See Arbegast v. Board of Educ of South New Berlin Central School, 65 N.Y.2d 
161,480 N.E.2d 365,490 N.Y.S.2d 751 (1985); hfaddox v. City of New York, 66 N.Y.2d '270, 
487 N.E.2d 553,496 N.Y.S.2d 726 (1985); infra notes 229-66 and nccompmying text. 
216. Z i i e r  v. Chemung County Performing Arts, Inc, 65 N.Y.2d 513,482 N.E.2d $98, 
493 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1985); infra notes 267-71 and accompanying text. 
217. Barker v. Kallasb, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 468 N.E.2d 39, 479 N.YS.2d 201 (19&0; infra 
notes 272-73 and accompanying text. 
218. See Report of the Judiciol Conference of the State of New York to the 1915 Leg- 
islature, reprinted in TWENTY-FIRST ANN. REP. N.Y. Jm. CONPER~NC~ 232 (1976). The Judi- 
cial Conference recommended that the provisions enacting a system of comparative negli- 
gence be inserted in the General Obligations Law, not in the CPLR See id. a t  239. 
219. Act of May 6,1975, ch. 69,1975 ~ICKINNEY'S S SSION LAWS OF NEW YO= 94 (cadi- 
fied a t  N.Y. CPLR 1411 (McKinney 1976)). 
220. With the passage of Article 14-A, New York has joined the rapidly growing num- 
ber of states that have adopted some form of comparative negligence. The doctrine of com- 
parative negligence has assumed a variety of guises, four of which may be briefly outlined. 
Under the "slight-gross" system, if the plaintiffs negligence is slight when compared to 
that of the defendant, the plaintiff may recover a judgment, but his dnrnnges (as under dl 
the systems of comparative negligence) will be d i i i h e d  by the percentnge of the fault 
attributable to him. If the plaintiffs negligence is more than "slight," however that term 
may be defined, then he may not recover for any of his damages. A second approach is to 
allow the plaintiff to recover if is negligence is less than fifty percent, or not more than 
forty-nine percent, of the total negligence of the parties contribution to ~ dnmnges. In 
some states, the plaintiff's contributory negligence is not a bar to recovery if such negligence 
is not greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought. Finnlly, 
there is the system of pure comparative negligence that allows o pparty o recovery hp- 
tive of whether he is more negligent than the defendant. For example, if o plnintia, who 
suffered $100,000 in damages, is adjudged to have been, compared with the dofendant, 
ninety-eight percent negligent, he will be entitled to recover S5000 from the defendant. See 
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recovery for the plaints, even though the conduct of each party is 
culpable.221 Article 14-A applies to any action, accruing on or after 
September 1, 1975,222 for personal injury, injury to property, or 
wrongful These provisions require that the claimant's re- 
covery be reduced to the degree that his own negligence or other 
culpable conduct caused the i n j ~ y . 2 ~ ~  Article 14-A is applicable to 
actions against a defendant for negligence, breach of warranty, and 
strict liability.226 
By adopting article 14-A, the Legislature specifically desig- 
nated both assumption of risk and contributory negligence as cul- 
pable conduct to be considered in proportioning the comparative 
fault of the parties.226 Under CPLR 1411, the relationship of each 
party's conduct to the injury, and the amount of damages that are 
recoverable is based upon a comparison of conduct that the law 
considers blame~orthy.2~~ If the claimant's conduct was wrongful, 
but did not contribute to causing his injuries or to their aggrava- 
tion, there is no diminution of the recoverable damages.226 
A. Assumption of Risk 
Although assumption of risk was designated by the Legislature 
as culpable conduct to be considered in assessing the parties' com- 
parative neither article 14-A nor its legislative history de- 
fines "assumption of risk."230 In addition, CPLR 1411 left it "un- 
clear whether express assumption of risk is subject to 
WEINSTEIN-KORN-MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE $ 1411.01 (1986). 
221. See Arbegast, 65 N.Y.2d a t  167, 480 N.E.2d a t  369,490 N.Y.S.2d a t  765. 
222. See WEINSTEIN-KORN-MJUER, CPLR MANUAL $ 11.07 (1985 rev. ed,) [hereinaftor 
cited as CPLR MANUAL]. 
223. N.Y. EPTL 5-4.2 and 11-3.2(b) were amended by chapter 69 of the Laws of 1976 
to assure that the provisions of article 14-A relating to comparative negligence are applica- 
ble in wrongful death actions. See 1975 MCKINNEY'S ESSION LAWS OF NEW YORK 94. 
224. See CPLR MANUAL, supra note 222, $ 11.07. 
225. See Report of the Judicial Conference of the State of New York to the 1976 Leg- 
islature, reprinted in TWENTY-FIRST ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE a t  239; Memorandum 
of Assemblyman Fink in support of 1975 Bill No. A417843277, reproduced in N.Y.L.J., 
Apr. 23, 1975, a t  7, col. 1; see ako CPLR MANUAL, supra note 222, $ 11.02. 
226. See Hoyt v. McCann, 88 A.D.2d 633,634,450 N.Y.S.2d 231, 232 (2d Dep't 1082); 
see generally WEINSTEIN-KORN-MILLER, supra note 220, $1411.03; see ako N.Y. CPLR 1411 
(McKinney 1976). 
227. See Arbegast, 65 N.Y.2d a t  168,480 N.E.2d a t  370,490 N.Y.S.2d a t  766. 
228. See id. a t  168-69,480 N.E.2d a t  370-71,490 N.Y.S.2d a t  756-57. 
229. See supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
230. See Arbegast, 65 N.Y.2d a t  169, 480 N.E.2d a t  371,490 N.Y.S.2d a t  767. 
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comparison."231 Recently, the Court of Appeals clarified this rela- 
tionship in Arbegast v. Board of Educati0n.2~~ 
In Arbegast, the plaintiff was thrown from a donkey while 
playing donkey ba~ketball.2~~ Prior to mounting the donkey, the 
plaintiff was informed by the defendant that she was participating 
at  her own risk?= The Court of Appeals held that it mas a com- 
plete defense to the plaintiff's cause of action that she expressly 
agreed to assume the risk involved in the activity that caused her 
i n j ~ r y . 2 ~ ~  The Court stated that once a party gives express consent, 
they are foreclosed from the use of CPLR 1411 and recovery is 
barred.236 The Arbegast Court made it clear, however, that if the 
assumption of risk is not expressed, but is only implied from the 
plaintiff's participation in the activity, then the comparative negli- 
gence principles of CPLR 1411 are applicable. The plaintiff, thus, 
would be allowed to recover damages based upon a comparison of 
each party's culpable conduct.237 
In Arbegast, the Court noted: "[tlhe existence of such an ex- 
press assumption of risk by the injured party is a matter of defense 
upon which the burden of proof will be on the party claiming to 
have thus been absolved of duty. . . and will be a factual issue for 
the jury, unless there is no real controversy as to the facts."238 The 
Court then observed that the plaintiff would have been entitled to 
a comparative -causation charge on implied assumption of the risk 
had she not conceded that she was told before the games began 
that "participants are at  their o m  risk."23e The Court also ruled 
that in light of that concession, the trial judge should have di- 
231. See id. CPLR 1411 does not address the issue of express assumption of risk, in fact 
the section is merely entitled "[dlamages recoverable when contributory nqligcnco or as- 
sumption of risk is established." N.Y. CPLR 1411 (hfcKinney 1976). 
232. 65 N.Y.2d 161,480 N.E.2d 365,490 N.Y.S.2d 751 (1985). 
. 
233. See id. a t  162,480 N.E.2d a t  366-67,490 N.Y.S.2d a t  752-53. 
234. See id. a t  163,480 N.E.2d a t  367,490 N.Y.S.2d a t  753. 
235. See id. a t  170,480 N.E.2d a t  371,490 N.Y.S.2d a t  757-58. 
236. See id. 
237. See id. a t  170, 480 N.E.2d a t  371, 490 N.Y.S.2d a t  751; see also Cowon, Tort 
Law: Sports Injury-A New Concept of Risk Assumption, N.Y.L.J., Auyst  9, 1985, nt 1, 
coL 1; Orzeske, Comparatiue Fault and Strict Products Liability, 8 J. PROD. LIAR 283,290 
(1985). 
238. Arbegast, 65 N.Y.2d a t  171,480 N.E.2d a t  372,490 N.YS.2d nt 753. 
239. See id. The Court made a connection between express assumption of the risk and 
an expression on the part of the defendant that the plaintiff partiu'pntes a t  his o m  risk. See 
Conason, supra note 237, a t  2; infra notes 264-66 and accompanying text. 
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rected a verdict for the defendant.2'O In specifically exempting ex- 
press assumption of risk from CPLR 1411, the Court of Appeals 
relied on the common law definition of express assumption. Under 
the common law, an express assumption of the risk was held to 
preclude any recovery. An advance agreement between the parties 
specifically would state that the defendant did not owe the plain- 
tiff a duty of reasonable care and the defendant would not be held 
liable for any conduct that was subsequently labeled negligentea41 ' 
By enacting article 14-A, the Legislature intended New York's 
comparative negligence statute to permit a recovery even though 
the conduct of both parties was ~ulpable.2'~ The Arbegast Court 
limited this intention by holding that the benefits of CPLR 1411 
do not extend to parties who expressly assume the ri~k.2 '~ The 
practitioner should be aware that Arbegast has received further 
support. For example, in Santangelo v. State:" the Court of 
Claims, relying on Arbegast, held that police officers could not re- 
cover for injuries sustained in apprehending a mental patient, who 
escaped from a mental institution due to the State's negligence, 
because as police officers, their activity was in the line of work for 
which they had expressly assumed the r i ~ k . 2 ~ V h e  Santangelo 
court extends the Arbegast holding by ruling that persons who 
partake in inherently dangerous occupations would not be allowed 
to take advantage of CPLR 1411.246 
In Maddox v. City of New York,2" a professional baseball 
player slipped and fell while playing at Shea Stadium, severely in- 
juring his knee. Subsequently, Maddox had three knee operations 
and was forced to prematurely end his professional career with the 
New York Yankees. After suing a number of parties, Maddox testi- 
fied a t  a deposition that he was aware of the wet field and had 
prior notice of the particular puddle in which he fell. Four of the 
240. See Arbegast, 65 N.Y.2d at 171, 480 N.E.2d at 372, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 758. 
241. See id. at 169, 480 N.E.2d at 371,490 N.Y.S.2d at 757. 
242. See id. at 167,480 N.E.2d at 369,490 N.Y.S.2d at 755. 
243. See Conason, supra note 237, at 2; see also WEINSTEIN-KORN-MILLER, supra noto 
220, 8 1411.03. 
244. 129 Miic. 2d 898, 494 N.Y.S.2d 49 (Ct. C1. 1985). 
245. See id. at 907, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 54. 
246. See id. 
247. 66 N.Y.2d 270, 487 N.E.2d 553,496 N.Y.S.2d 726 (1985). For a discussion o f  tho 
Second Department's decision in Maddox, see Taddeo, Catastrophic Sports Injuries and 
the Law: Maddox v. City o f  New York, e t  al., 194 N.Y.L.J., July 12, 1985, at 5, col. 1. 
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defendants and other parties thus moved for summary judgment 
on the ground that Maddox had assumed the risk. In response, 
Maddox argued that he had only assumed the risk of the game, not 
of the dangerous condition of the playing field. 
Although the case involved an implied assumption of risk, as 
opposed to an express agreement, the Court of Appeals affirmed 
the Second Department's dismissal of the plaintiff's ~omplaint?'~ 
Although Maddox's cause of action accrued before the application 
of the comparative negligence stat~te,2'~ the decision might have a 
bearing on future cases where a knowledgeable person engages in 
activity which he knows to entail the very risk resulting in his in- 
jury.260 It would appear that the Arbegast holding is consistent 
with the Court's analysis in Maddox. 
The Arbegast and Maddox holdings may also affect the liabil- 
ity of one sports participant to another.2u1 In Turcotte u. Fell,lua a 
professional jockey was injured during a race due to the alleged 
negligence of another j0ckey.2~~ The court barred recovery on the 
grounds that the claimant knew of the dangers associated with the 
sport and, by mere participation, agreed to relieve the defendant of 
any duty owed to The court stated that CPLR 1411 did not 
apply because the defendant owed no duty of care to the plaintiff 
with respect to the injury-causing e ~ e n t . 2 ~ ~  It is significant to note 
248. See Maddox, 66 N.Y.2d a t  279,487 N.E.2d a t  558,496 N.YS.2d a t  731. 
249. See id. a t  275.487 N.E.2d a t  554,496 N.YS.2d a t  727 (the injury occuned on June 
13, 1975); see ako Lamphear v. State, 91 kD.2d 791, 458 N.Y.S.2d 71 (3d Dep't 1982); 
McDaniel v. Clarkstown Central School Dist, 111 kD.2d 151,488 N.YS.2d 7&3 (2d Dep't 
1985) (plainWs contributory negligence was a complete bar to recovery when the cause of 
action accrued prior to New York's system of comparative negligence, but n clnim n d g  
after September 1,1975, in this case for wrongful death, does create a triable issue as to the 
degree of defendant's negligence). 
250. See Hoenig, Product Liability, 195 N.Y.L.J., hfar. 27, 1986, a t  1, coL 1. 
251. See Conason, supra note 237, a t  2. 
252. 123 Misc 2d 877, 474 N.Y.S.2d 893 (Sup. Ct ,  Nassau Co. 1984). 
253. See id. a t  877-78, 474 N.Y.S.2d a t  894. 
254. See id. a t  883-84,474 N.Y.S.2d a t  897-98; see also Clapmnn v. City of New York, 
63 N.Y.2d 669,468 N.E.2d 697,479 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1984) (the owner of a b = b d  field only 
has a duty to provide adequate screening behind home plate where the danger of beimg 
struck by a ball is greatest). Accord Davidoff v. hletropolitan Baseball Club, 61 N.Y.2d 996, 
463 N.E.2d 1219,475 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1984); Akins v. Glens Falls City School Dtt, 53 N.Y.2d 
325,424 N.E.2d 531,441 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1981). Compare 5 b i t o  v. V i e  of Albion, 100 
kD.2d 739,473 N.YS.2d 651 (4th Dep't 1984) (an owner of a field had n duty to provide 
adequate screening where the seat. were located because there were no seats locnted behind 
home plate); Sawyer v. State, 127 Misc 2d 295,485 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Ct CL 1985). 
255. See Turcotte, 123 hlisc 2d a t  884,474 N.YS.2d a t  896. 
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that the issue of duty preceded any discussion of "culpable con- 
duct."26e In light of the Arbegast decision, it would seem viable for 
a court, in a position similar to the Turcotte court, to allow a 
claimant to take advantage of article 14-A as long as there is no 
express assumption of the risk.267 
Courts have also barred recovery of injured amateur sports 
participants, but not on the Arbegast theory of an express assump- 
tion of risk. In Cimino v. Town of Hemp~tead:~~ the Second De- 
partment barred recovery by an injured swimmer who was struck 
by a powerful w a ~ e . 2 ~ ~  The court found that the claimant had ob- 
served the turbulent water prior to the accident and still decided 
to surf.2e0 In another swimming case, the Court of Appeals barred 
recovery by a swimmer injured when he dove onto a sandbar not 
visible from the water's sur fa~e .2~~ The Court held that the State 
was not put on notice as to the dangerousness of the area because 
very few accidents had occurred In addition, the Court 
prevented recovery because it  determined that the claimant had 
previously visited the area six times that ~ummer .2~~  
Both decisions found that the defendants had no duty to 
warn, thus there was no basis for a negligence ~ l a i m . 2 ~ ~  Due to the 
fact that the plaintiffs in these cases could not establish a cause of 
action, a decision could not be made as to the applicability of 
CPLR 1411.266 If, in fact, the defendants did owe a duty to fore- 
warn and failed to do so, the Arbegast decision would suggest that, 
at  best, only an implied assumption of the risk existed in these 
cases and CPLR 1411 would apply.2ee 
256. See Conason, supra note 237, a t  2. 
257. See id. 
258. 110 A.D.2d 805,488 N.Y.S.2d 68 (2d Dep't 1985). 
259. See id. a t  805, 488 N.Y.S.2d a t  69. 
260. See id. 
261. See Herman v. State, 63 N.Y.2d 822,472 N.E.2d 24,482 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1984). 
262. See id. a t  823,472 N.E.2d a t  25,482 N.Y.S.2d a t  249. 
263. See id. 
264. See id.; Cimino, 110 A.D.2d a t  805, 488 N.Y.S.2d a t  70. 
265. See Herman, 63 N.Y.2d a t  823, 472 N.E.2d a t  25, 482 N.Y.S.2d a t  249; see also 
Clark v. Goshen Sunday Morning Softball League, 129 Misc. 2d 401,493 N.Y.S.2d 262 (Sup. 
Ct., Orange Co. 1985) (plaintiff assumed the risk by virtue of attending a sporting ovont 
even though he did not intend to view the game as a spectator). 
266. See Conason, supra note 237, a t  2. 
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B. Labor Law Violations 
Notwithstanding CPLR 1411, a contractor or owner of a site is 
strictly liable for any injuries which are caused by a violation of 
certain safety provisions of the Labor Law. For example, in Zim- 
mer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, In~.,2~' the Court of Ap- 
peals held that plaintifPs contributory negligence was not subject 
to comparison with the defendant's statutory violation of section 
240(1) of the Labor La-dss because the Legislature intended its vi- 
olation to establish absolute liability.2se The Court held that the 
trial court should have directed a verdict in the plaintifPs favor 
because there was no evidence at  trial to support a finding that the 
statutory violation was not a proximate cause of the injuries.270 
Thus, comparative negligence principles are not applicable when- 
ever statutory liability is held to be absolute and a plaintifPs re- 
covery should not be affected by his own fault.271 
C. Legal Prohibitions 
There is also an absolute bar to recovery by a plaintiff whose 
injuries were the direct result of a "serious violation" of a statute 
prohibiting the conduct involved. For example, in Barker u. Kat- 
the plaintiff was injured while unlawfully making a bomb. 
Because of his knowing and intentional participation in a criminal 
act, he could not recover for any portion of his injuries?7g 
D. Conclusion 
The practitioner should be alert for situations where deci- 
sional law bars the application of CPLR article 14-A. This is par- 
ticularly true when a party admits to an express assumption of the 
risk or when a "highly trained" party impliedly assumes the risk. 
267. 65 N.Y.2d 513,482 N.E.2d 898,493 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1985). 
268. See N.Y. LAB. LAW 3 240(1) (hIcKinney 1965 6: Supp. 1986). 
269. See Zimmer, 65 N.Y.2d at 520-21,482 N.E.2d at 900-01,493 N.YS.2d nt 105. 
270. See id. at 524,482 N.E.2d at 903,493 N.Y.S.2d at 107. 
271. See id. Accord Wright v. State, 110 A.D.2d 1060, 488 N.YS.2d 917 (4th Dep't 
1985) (which also distinguishes between the applicability of comparative negligence stan- 
dards under N.Y. LABOR LAW 33 240(1) and 241(6)). See ako Long v. Forest-Fehlhnber, 55 
N.Y.2d 154,433 N.E.2d 115,448 N.Y.S.2d 132 (1982). 
272. 63 N.Y.2d 19,468 NJ3.2d 39,479 N.YS.2d 201 (1984). 
273. See id. at 28-29,468 N.E.2d at 43,479 N.YS.2d at 205-06. 
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